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  In Tunisia, water pricing is considered as a significant economic tool in the reform 
process of water demand management. Indeed, the irrigation water prices were for long 
time largely subsidized and do not reflect the reality of the resource production costs. 
Following  the  recommendations  of  the  Agricultural  Structural  Adjustment  Program 
started in 1986, a new water pricing system has been settled up in order to find a com-
promise between the government aiming to cover investment costs, the service manager 
looking to adjust financial costs and the farmers whose objective remain to have water 
at lower prices (Bachta et      2004). Simultaneously, an institutional reform has been 
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implemented with the objective of transferring water management from the State to Wa-
ter Users’ Associations (WUA)
1. WUA becomes the gatekeeper of the water resource at 
the local level. They also determine the irrigation water price, in the irrigation districts 
under their authorities, according to the operation and maintenance (O&M) they spend 
for supplying water to the farm level. Currently, an average significant reduction of the 
irrigation water subsidies is observed following the increase in irrigation water tariffs all 
over the country. However, those prices still only recover a part of the full water pro-
duction and distribution costs.  
  On the other hand, the irrigated areas in Tunisia are still annually growing during the 
last three decades and no water savings were recorded in the agricultural sector. The 
total water demand at the national level is also growing despite the fact that water prices 
are increasing in average. In addition, the intensification rates in these areas as well as 
yields of irrigated crops are still under their full potential (MARH, 2006).  
  According to the economic theory, the farmers would respond to the rising of water 
prices by reducing their consumption, according to a negative slope curve demand. 
However, in the case of water, this reaction is not always true. Several studies showed 
that the water pricing does not cause necessarily the expected effects on water demand 
because of the low elasticity of demand for this resource (Varela-Ortega et    , 1998; 
Gomez limon and Berbel, 2000; Feijoo         2000). Only beyond a certain thresold 
does irrigation water demand become responsive to increased water charges (De Fai-
ture and Perry, 2002). Despite the importance of this issue on water pricing policy, 
there are few studies have been done in Tunisia (Thabet, 2003; Sghaier, 1995; Chebil et 
  ., 2008).  
  This paper is a contribution to the study of the impact of the Tunisian irrigation pric-
ing policy on water demand at the farm level. We examine the effects of water pricing 
on economic, social and environmental indicators of the greenhouses production sys-
tems  in  the  irrigated  schemes  of  Teboulba  (Tunisia).  A  Positive  Mathematical  pro-
gramming (PMP) model considering the risk on output prices was is used for this pur-
pose. This king of PMP models is used for the first time in Tunisia for the estimation of 
irrigation water demand functions. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the methodological 
framework, the adopted mathematical model and the study region are described. The 
next section presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, the concluding com-




  PMP is a methodology developed to calibrate linear programming models using in-
formation contained in dual variables of calibration constraints to specify appropriate 
non-linear objective functions (Howitt, 1995; Heckelei and Britz, 2000). The non line-
arity can be introduced into the objective function at the receipts level (Howitt, 1995a) 
or at the cost production function (Arfini and Paris, 1995). The PMP model has been 
widely used in irrigation water pricing analysis (Ariaaza and Gomez, 2003). However, 
this paper is a first attempt to apply this model in the case of Tunisian irrigated agricul-
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ture. The following explains the main steps of this method: 
￿        is formally described in the following model: 
                  = - ¢ ¢   (1) 
Subject to: 
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Where     denotes the objective function value,   and   are       vectors of output 
prices and sales activity levels, respectively.   and   are       vectors of variable cost 
per unit of activity and production activity level.   represents a matrix of coefficients in 
resource constraints,   is a vector of available resource quantities.    is       vector of 
observed production activity levels and ε  denotes a vector of small positive numbers. 
– In this first step, the           is solved in order to obtain values of the dual variables 
associated to the calibration constraints. 
￿        consists of employing the vector of dual variables to specify a non-linear ob-
jective function in such a way that the marginal cost of the preferable activities are 
equal to their respective revenues at the base year activity level (  ) (Heckelei and 
Britz, 2000). The variable cost function has the following form: 
         = + ¢   (2) 
Where  ʹ denotes variable costs  α  and β  are parameters calculated from the dual vari-
ables and used to calibrate the variable costs (see Gohin and Chantreuil, 2000).  
￿       : After integrating the new variable costs equation (3), the resulting model fit 
in exactly the base year solution and the original constraints structure. The model (1) 
becomes non-linear as follows: 
  ( )                    = - + ¢   (3) 
Subject to: 
     ≤  
0 ≥    
 
Model specification 
  The aim of this study is to integrate the risk on prices in the retained PMP model. For 
this purpose, we use the “mean-variance” approach which has been introduced firstly by 
Markowitz  (1952).  We  consider  ten  states  of  nature  relative  to  the  observations  on 
prices during the last ten years. The model of expected value (E)-variance (V) maxi-
mizes the expected return by minimizing its variability. Hence, an objective function is 
developed taking into account simultaneously the average income maximisation and the 
income fluctuations minimization. According to this method, we maximise the expected 
income rather than the average income:  
  ( ) ( )             = -   (4) 
( )     : Expected income for each farmer’s group according to the observed prices per                       47 
 
environmental state. 
 :  Coefficient of risk aversion (generally assumed equal to 1 when crop mix in the 
sample is homogeneous (Louhichi et   ., 1999; Abbes et   ., 2005)).  
( )     :  Standard deviation of the income;  
  The mean and the standard deviation relative to the expected income can be written 
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     :  price per crop and environmental state; 
      : yield per crop and per zone; 
     :  variable cost per crop and per zone;  
  :  environmental state (  = 1, …, 10 years of observation); 
    :  income in the k
th environmental state 
 :  crop (    1, 2, 3) ; 
    :  surface per crop;  
  By calibrating model (4) using PMP approach, the increasing variable production 
cost per crop is assumed to be a non linear function of the crop allocated surface (Gohin 
and Chantreuil, 2000). Model (4) becomes as follows: 
  ( ) ( )                = -   (5) 
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Variables: 
  :  farm income 
    :  surface of the crop    
  :  temporary labour employed 
Parameters: 
    :  market price of the crop    48                                
 
     :  irrigation water price 
  :  temporary labour wage 
 et          : parameters of the cost function estimated using the PMP 
     :  water requirement of the crop  , and  ( )               ´ ´  constitutes the irrigation 
cost 
     :  labour requirement of the crop   
  :  exploited total agricultural surface 
  :  availability of the irrigation water 
   :  availability of permanent and family labour  
 
 
Study region and data 
  The data used in this study were collected from small-scale greenhouse farmers in 
the region of Teboulba (Center-East of Tunisia/Governorate of Monastir). This region 
belongs to Nebhana’ irrigated district, where water scarcity is an important problem. 
The main water source of this irrigated area is transferred from Nebhana dam situated 
around 80 Km. Irrigation water prices in Teboulba are some of the highest in Tunisia. 
The price is approximately 0.15 TND m
–3, whilst supplies in some other regions of Tu-
nisia are priced at a minimum rate of 0.04 TND m
–3. Volumetric water pricing is ap-
plied in the region. A water meter is installed at each farm and individual consumption 
is measured and charged by the WUA. Given the intensive-water character of green-
houses horticultural production, this resource is not negligible in the variable production 
cost for farmers in the area examined (between 14 and 41%, 31.4% in average, accord-
ing to our survey). 
  The total agricultural area of Teboulba is around 1914 ha, of which 600 ha are irri-
gated. Horticultural production in non-warmed greenhouses is important, providing 
nearly the third of the production of the governorate of Monastir (Commisariat Régional 
au Développement Agricole, Monastir, 2004). The survey was carried out in 2005 on a 
sample of 62 randomly selected farms producing tomato, melon and pepper in non-
warmed greenhouses. The questionnaire is composed of two main sequences: (i) a 
farmer’s identification sequence (socio-economic and demographic characteristics) and 
(ii) a farm’ identification sequence (practiced crops, amounts and costs of inputs; quan-
tities and value of outputs, etc.). The irrigated perimeter of Teboulba is divided into 
three schemes (Zone 1: Bir Amach; Zone 2: Nakharia; Zone 3: Aitha-boudriss). The  
 
Table 1. Main socio-economic characteristics of the sample 
  Zone 1  Zone 2         
age of farmers (Average)  45.7  42  43.7 
”age” of the irrigated district (number of years in function-
ing) 
31.4  25.6  22.4 
Main activity (agriculture) (%)  50  70  100 
Schooling (average number of years in education for farm-
ers of the each district) 
2.3  4.2  7.4 
Average size of the farm (ha)  1.6  3.2  2.6                       49 
 
                            5.5  6.8  5.8 
three schemes are different by their location, date of creation, average size of the farms 
and by some socioeconomic characteristics of the farmers (Table 1).  
 
Water pricing scenarios  
  In Tunisia, it has been observed that cost estimation of water produced and delivered 
is not transparent (Thabet and Chebil, 2006). Thus any increase in water price is not 
well understood by farmers and can lead to dissatisfaction. Data is not consistent, mak-
ing the establishment of a water pricing scheme difficult. Moreover, the water authority 
lacks accurate information on water productivity at farm level leading to asymmetric 
information on the side of the authorities as well as on the side of the farmers. Based on 
this qualification of water "market" in Tunisia, and on the trend of irrigation pricing 
policies, we choose, in this study, to test scenarios reflecting farmers’ attitude as well as 
government preferences:  
•                                : Full cost recovery. Public authorities’ aims first to 
a variable cost recovery related to the O&M of the hydraulic infrastructure and sec-
ond to recover the full costs in the long run. Indeed, currently the O&M costs (0.135 
TND
2/m3) are covered by the actual rates of water charged in the studied region. Ac-
cording to this, only the full cost scenario will be tested in this paper. Last studies' 
carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources at the end of the 
Nineties, estimated this price to be around 0.450 TND.  
•                            : Willingness to pay the irrigation water. In fact, a study 
conducted by Chebil        (2007), using Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) on 
the same farmers’ sample used for this study, has revealed an average WTP of 0.22 
TND. The latter is used in the second scenario. 
•                                   :  An  arbitrary  intermediate  price  between  the  two 
above values is taken: 0.35 TND.  
 
 
Empirical results  
Water demand functions  
  PMP  models  were  simulated  for  each  scenario  and  each  of  the  three  irrigated 
schemes mentioned above. When water demand schedules are calculated we can ob-
serve that differences in water demand in the three irrigated schemes become apparent 
as  shown  by  figure  1.  In  fact,  farmers  in  the  scheme  (1),  opposed  to  those  of  the 
schemes (2) and (3), are sensitive for changes from Status Quo (SQ) to FS. This can be 
explained by the higher average of water consumption per ha in this area where soil 
quality and nematode diseases are frequent. However, the change in water consumption 
is small, and farmers continue to consume, in average, more than what farmers of dis-
tricts (2) and (3) do in the           . For water rates ranging from the IS to the GS 
price level, water demand by farmers of the district (1) becomes inelastic and quite sta-
ble around 1400 m
3/ha, which remains very low with regards to crop requirements.  
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Figure 1. Water demand by group for each scenario 
 
from current price charged in the region to 0.27 TND. Farmers are price unresponsive 
until achieving their willingness to pay. From this price and upward, water demand in 
the schemes (2) and (3) becomes elastic and farmers reply to the increase of water rates 
in scenarios IS and GS by decreasing their consumption of water. Due to the fact that 
water consumption per crop is almost the same for all crops practiced in the region 
(around 300 m
3/green-house/crop cycle), the decrease of the average water consumption 
per farm results in a fall in the number of their owned green-houses.  
 
 
Economic impact  
  Increases of water prices reduce substantially farmers’ income as shown by Figure 2. 





































                       51 
 
Figure 2. Income reduction for each scenario and for each group of farmers 
(i)  public-sector water income means a transfer of income from the farming sector to 
the public sector. In the first instance it is a burden to be borne by the farmers (Go-
mez Limon      , 2000);  
(ii) In addition, farmers respond to higher prices by reducing their water consumption 
through changes in their crop plans. However, alternative cropping systems are lim-
ited in the case of green-houses production at the studied region. Indeed, limited 
crops alternatives with almost similar water consumption per green-house are prac-
ticed in the Teboulba region. Then, our model indicates a reduction in the cropped 
area per farm which is presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2. Average cropped area (ha) (green-houses) by farm in each scheme and by sce-
nario 
                               
SQ  0.27  0.35  0.29 
FS  0.25  0.35  0.29 
IS  0.21  0.31  0.24 
    0.21  0.23  0.24 
 
  Farmers in district (1) reduce water consumption in FS without reducing significantly 
their cropped area, which means that they start to use less water, in average, per ha. This 
can lead in a first step to an improvement in water productivity. The same remark can-
not be drawn for farmers in schemes (2) and (3) who irrigate with doses close to the 
theoretical need advised by the agricultural extension services in the region.  
  Tables 2 shows that a full cost recovery price of water (GS) is critical for the horti-
cultural production activity in the area. An exogenous shock such as an increase in input 
prices, a fall in the output prices or a climate risk can seriously threaten the incomes of 
the farmers (who already become vulnerable due to the implemented pricing policies) 




  Farm labour demand, particularly the temporary labour, is slightly affected in all the 
tested scenarios. In fact, in the scheme (1), farmers respond to increased water rates by 
reducing their water consumption per ha or by decreasing the cropped area. No change 
in the temporary labour demand is observed. This is because of the part-time aspect of 
farmers’, where 50 % of them have another main activity than agriculture (table 1). 
However, in schemes (2) and (3), farms are larger than those of scheme (1), by the 
same, the average number of green-houses in these districts is also larger compared to 
the first scheme. When water prices shift from 0.15 to 0.24 TND/m
3, farmers reduce 
their temporary labour demand in the short run by around 10%. A higher water price 
would have small effects on the temporary labour demand which becomes inelastic.  
  Figure 3 reveals that a gradual water price increase will have small social effects on 
the green-houses production systems of Teboulba region. This is mainly due to the fa-
milial character of the agriculture in these schemes, where most of farmers are perma-52                                
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  In this paper we used a positive mathematical model to simulate the effects of Tuni-
sian irrigation water pricing policies in three irrigated schemes located in the coastal-
central part of Tunisia (Teboulba). The study area is known by its horticultural produc-
tion  under  non-warmed  green-houses  technique.  The  three  schemes  are  different  by 
their location, date of creation, average size of the farms and by some socioeconomic 
characteristics of the farmers. Three scenarios of irrigation water pricing were simulated 
(farmers’ scenario reflected by their willingness to pay, Governmental scenario aiming 
to a full cost recovery of produced and delivered irrigation water, and an arbitrary in-
termediate price between these two extremes).  
  Results show that water demand in group 1 remains inelastic until achieving the price 
of 0.2 TND m
–3. A higher price would affect negatively, water consumption, farmer’s 
incomes as well as the occasional labor demand. Farmers of this first group belong to 
the oldest irrigated area in Teboulba, they are thus more experienced, but their land is 
also the less productive. Also, only 50% of farmers of this group consider agriculture as 
a main income activity. They are the less educated (compared to groups 2 and 3) and 
their average land size/farm is also the smallest in the region (1.6 ha compared to 3.2 ha 
in zone 2 and 2.6 ha in zone 3).  
  For groups 2 and 3, the water demand curves remain highly inelastic even with a full 
cost recovery price. However, the reductions in incomes reach almost 20%. Moreover, 
0.45 TND m
–3 is a critical price and can threaten the sustainability of the production 
systems of the region.  
  These results show that the local water rates implementation by WUA according to 
the specific socioeconomic and production conditions of the regions is a good and nec-
essary strategy adopted by the Tunisian government in the framework of water man-
agement transfer. However, as seen in our case, three different regions, even though 
located in the same area, can be different regarding many of their socioeconomic and                       53 
 
productivity attributes. In our case, farmers from all of these regions belong to the same 
WUA  and  pay  the  same  water  rates.  Thus,  the  implementation  of  the  same  pricing 
scheme for all of them will provide different results and can threat the financial sustain-
ability of a wide range of irrigated farmers. 
  The most farmers will be efficient in their irrigation water use, the most they will 
resist to higher irrigation prices. However, the improvement of the water use efficiency 
needs a set of actions and policies that have to be adopted and encouraged by the gov-
ernment. Thus, it is also necessary to accompany the implementation of new water pric-
es by a bundle of agricultural policies designated to improve the productivity of water 
uses. Incentives for an adoption of water saving technologies, use of crops which highly 
valorize  the  irrigation  water,  adequate  solutions  for  the  problem  of  nematodes,  etc. 
could be among agricultural policies which lead to a reduction of the negative effect of 
increasing water tariffs on farmers’ income and help achieving a total recovery cost of 
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